Isaiah Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty Essay -- Politics Political Es

Isaiah Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty In his article "Two Concepts of Liberty", Isaiah Berlin identifies and contrasts the two components of freedom: negative and positive liberty. While the author’s voice is often confused amidst the frequent references to other political philosophies from Platonic to Millian theories, Berlin successfully argues that both of these notions can be misconstrued to the point where liberty itself is sacrificed. Although reasonable, Berlin’s assessment of the two concepts seems artificial and effortlessly simple, as if freedom could be defined according to a rubric; one can, however, agree with his statement that absolute freedom for one individual undoubtedly limit’s the freedom of another. Positive liberty, in the simplest sense, is freedom to, answering the question "Who governs me?"; it is the liberty of self-government. Negative liberty, on the other hand, is freedom from, and answers the question "How far does government interfere with me?"; it is the liberty of limited control by government. According to Berlin, negative liberty is freedom from interference from others; the larger the range of non-interference, the greater one’s negative liberty. As no individual’s actions are committed in a vacuum and will always indirectly affect others, this liberty must be reasonably restricted for the sake of other values, such as equality and justice. As an extension in one’s negative liberty reduces that of another, Berlin states that negative liberty ought to be restricted by law in order for every individual to enjoy it at a minimum. The author reasons that maximum negative liberty could only be feasible in a utopia where all individuals are wholly rational, and where the wishes of all su... ... same. Unfortunately the author never presents a wholly sound distinction between negative and positive liberty, as each negative liberty can logically render itself a positive one. Berlin’s final arguments suggest pluralism, highlighting that there is no single compatible goal or ideal uniform to all individuals; Berlin is clear that a strict minimum of negative liberty is necessary. His estimations of such implications of liberty are both logical and convincing: that an intrusion on the rights of others will always occur in the case of one’s heightened liberty, and that any endeavour to broaden one’s liberty would require the restructuring of the definition of freedom itself. Liberty, according to Berlin, is not committed to democracy; thus, just as authority must be limited for liberty to subsist, so must liberty be restrained for it to be of any significance.